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Abstract _ 
largue in this paper that the imposition of insider trading regulations on a securities market 
generates not on1y a reallocation of wealth from insiders to liquidity traders, but also a 
reallocation of risk from the former to the lanero I further argue that, although the wealth 
reallocation has no impact on social welfare, under plausible assumptions, the risk reallocation 
imposes a cost on society. 
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1- INTRODUCTION 1 
The bulk: of the literature on insider trading has focussed on the impact of insider trading 
regulation (ITR) on market liquidity and informational efficiency; see, for example, Kyle (1985), 
Subrahmanyam (1991), and Fishman and Hagerty (1992). The relationship between ITR and 
social welfare, on the other hand, has received much less attention, although it has been 
addressed by Ausubel (1990), Leland (1992), and Estrada (1993a,b). In this paper, I attempt to 
analyze the welfare issue from a novel perspective. 
Most discussions on ITR focus on the wealth real1ocation generated by the imposition of 
this regulation. However, the risk real1ocation forced by ITR, although critical to determine the 
impact of this regulation on social welfare, is usual1y ignored. In this paper, I basical1y make 
two points: First, that under plausible conditions, the risk real1ocation forced by ITR imposes 
a cost on society. And, second, that this cost is increasing in the difference in risk aversion 
between insiders and liquidity traders, as long as the risk aversion of the latter is higher than that 
of the former. Therefore, the higher the risk aversion of liquidity traders, compared to that of 
insiders, the weaker the case for imposing ITR. 
The rest of the paper is organized as fol1ows. In part 11, I introduce the model, which 
is a simplified version of the analytical framework in Estrada (1993b). In part 111, I analyze the 
impact of the risk real1ocation forced by the imposition of ITR on social welfare. And, final1y, 
in part IV, I surnmarize the implications of the analysis. 
11- THE MODEL 
Consider a one-period economy where Odenotes the present (the beginning of the period) 
and 1 denotes the future (the end of the period). Further, consider three types of traders 
interacting in a market for a risky asset: insiders (indexed by N), liquidity traders (indexed by 
Q), and a market maker. This interaction takes place either in an unregulated market (indexed 
1 I would like to thank Ignacio Peña, Asani Sarkar, participants of the First Conference in 
Law and Economics (Universidad Carlos 111, Madrid, Spain), and participants of the Gerzensee 
Conference on Regulation and Risk in the Financial Services Area (Gerzensee, Switzerland). The 
views expressed below and any errors that may remain are entirely my own. 
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by U) or in a regulated market (indexed by R); that is, a market under ITR. 2 
Let Xij be trader i's demand for the risky asset in the jth market. Further, let POj be the 
price of this asset in the jth market at the beginning of the period, and PI its price at the end of 
the periodo This terminal price is given by PI =PI +E, where PI is the expected (terminal) price 
of the risky asset given aH publicly-available information, and E is a random variable such that 
E- N(O,EE)' Thus, the terminal price of the risky asset is determined by aH publicly-available 
information and by a (normaHy-distributed) random shock. This random shock may be thought 
of as representing firm-specific events that affect the value of the firm that issues the risky asset 
under consideration; hence, E represents inside information and is observed only by insiders. 
Insiders, defined as those traders that (directly or indirectly) observe inside information, 
are assumed to trade for informational reasons. They costlessly observe aH publicly-available 
information about the terminal price of the risky asset (summarized in the parameter PI) and a 
given realization of the variable E (El); their trading strategy is considered below. Unlike 
insiders, liquidity traders do not trade for informational reasons. They are assumed to demand 
a random quantity XQof the risky asset, such that XQ- N(O,EQ). This demand is assumed to be 
independent from the type of market (regulated or unregulated) in which liquidity traders trade, 
and to have no information content; that is, Cov(e,XQ)=O. 
The timing of the model is as foHows. At the beginning of the period, endowments are 
distributed, information and liquidity trading are realized, and demands are submitted to the 
market maker, who sets the price that clears the market for the risky asset. At the end of the 
period, when aH uncertainty is resolved and the payoffs of the portfolios are realized, insiders 
and liquidity traders possess (random) terminal wealth (Wb) given by: 
_1 0(.,; _)_ (11) 
w¡j = w¡ + V'1 - POj Xij , i=N,Q, j=U,R 
where w? is trader i's (certain) initial wealth, and (PI-POj)X¡j are trader i's trading profits in the 
jth market. 
2 In what foHows, subscripts i will be used to index traders (i=N,Q), and subscripts j to 
index markets (j = U,R). 
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Insiders and liquidity traders are assumed to be risk averse and to have a negative 
exponential utility function (V); that is, V¡(wj)=l-EXP(-a¡wj), i=N,Q, where a¡ (a¡>O) is the 
absolute risk aversion parameter. The expected value of V, conditional on an insider's private 
information set (E), is given by: 
(2) 
Thus, insiders are assumed to select, conditional on their private information, the demand for 
the risky asset that maximizes (2). 
The market maker is assumed to be risk neutral and to set the price of the risky asset 
efficientIy; that is, by taking into account all publicly-available information and the order flow. 3 
Thus, his pricing function is given by: 
j=U,R (3) 
where (Xj is a parameter whose reciprocal measures the liquidity of the jth market. 
Let an equilibrium be defined as a realization of the random variable POj such that the 
following two conditions hold: 
i) X;j = argmax E[VJw~j)I€=€l] , j=U,R (4)
"Nj 
ii) P;j = E(P1IX;j+XQ) , j=U,R 
That is, an equilibrium is a (current) price of the risky asset that: first, arises from a demand 
for the risky asset that maximizes the utility of insiders, conditional on their private 
information;4 and, second, is efficient in the sense that it is equal to the expected (terminal) 
3 Hence, the market maker is constrained to make zero profits and his welfare is not 
analyzed. 
4 As argued above, an insider's demand for the risky asset follows from the maximization 
of (2). Note, however, that maximizing this expression is equivalent to maximizing an insider's 
(conditional) certainty equivalent of wealth (CENI l), which is given by CENI l =E(w~ I l)-
(aN/2)Var(w~ I E). Thus, for simplicity, in what follows, insiders are assumed to maximize 
CEN I € . 
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price of the risky asset, conditional on aH the information available to the market maker. 
When selecting their portfolio, insiders behave strategicaHy in the sense that their choice 
takes into account the impact of their demand on the price of the risky asset. That is, they solve 
their maximization problem by taking the market maker's pricing fu'nction (but not the price of 
the risky asset) as given. It is conjectured that insiders' demand for the risky asset is a linear 
function of their private information; that is, XNj ={3jl, for a given parameter {3j. As will be seen 
below, this conjecture is confmned in equilibrium.s 
The structure of the model is such that the market maker selects the parameter that 
determines the liquidity of the market (CXj)' and insiders select the parameter that determines their 
demand ({3j). Note that, in equilibrium, the value of these parameters will depend on whether 
or not the market is regulated. Thus, in the unregulated market, the foHowing theorem holds: 
Theorem 1: When all traders are risk averse and insider trading is allowed, there exists an 
equilibrium characterized by the parameters: 
(4) 
p~ = 1 _ (5) 
2u~ + aN(u~)2 EQ 
Proof: A representative insider's terminal wealth can be written as: 
(6) 
Taking the expected value and the variance of (6), both conditional on the insider's private 
information, and replacing them into the expression for the insider's (conditional) certainty 
equivalent of wealth yields: 
s The plausibility of linear strategies has been strengthened by work by Bhattacharya and 
Spiegel (1991), who analyze linear and nonlinear strategies and show that, if informed traders 
had to choose between them, they would choose the former over the latter. 
. . _._ .._-_._------------~-------------------------
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(7) 
Maximizing (7) with respect to xNU and solving for the insider's optimal demand for the risky 
asset yields the optimal value of {3u ({3~), which is given by (5). Substituting the insider's optimal 
demand for the risky asset into (3), and applying the projection theorem to solve for the optimal 
value of au (a~), yields (4). • 
RecalI that, for the purposes of the analysis, a regulated market is one in which insider 
trading is prohibited. If ITR were assumed to be fulIy effective thus fulIy preventing insider 
trading (that is, (3R =0), the regulated market would be infinitely liquid.6 In order to avoid this 
extreme result, it is assumed that ITR reduces insider trading to a minimum level, without 
eliminating it completely. This minimum level of insider trading is determined by the parameter 
{3R ={3min; which is exogenous to the model. 7 Thus, in the regulated market, the folIowing 
theorem holds: 
Theorem 2: When all traders are risk averse and insider trading is restricted, there exists an 
equilibrium characterized by the parameters: 
(8) 
(9) 
Proof: The parameter that determines the insider's minimum demand for the risky asset is 
determined exogenously and given by (9). Substituting the insider's minimum demand for the 
risky asset into (3), and applying the projection theorem to solve for the optimal value of a R 
(a;), yields (8).• 
6 This folIows from the fact that, as shown below by (8), {3R =0 implies aR =0. Since market 
liquidity (Lj) is usualIy defined as ~ = l/aj' then the claim folIows. 
7 This parameter may be thought of as determining the maximum amount of insider trading 
in which insiders can engage without being detected. 
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Although the equilibrium in the regulated market is simple, the complexity of the 
equilibrium in the unregulated market precludes a tractable analysis in closed formo Therefore, 
the impact of ITR on social welfare is evaluated below using numerical analysis. The welfare 
analysis is performed in terms of a representative trader of each type, and is performed ex-ante; 
that is, before the realization of the random variables. Thus, an insider's (unconditional) 
expected terminal utility in the unregulated market and that in the regulated market are given, 
respectively, by: 
(lO) 
(11) 
A liquidity trader's (unconditional) expected terminal utility in the unregulated market and that 
in the regulated market, on the other hand, are given, respectively, by: 
(12) 
(13) 
Let social welfare in the jth market (SWj) be defined as the joint expected utility of 
insiders and liquidity traders in that market; that is, SWj= E(VNj + VQj)' where E(V¡j) is trader 
i's expected utility in the jth market. Further, let trader i's (unconditional) certainty equivalent 
of wealth in the jth market (CEij) be defined as CE¡j=E(wlj)-(a/2)Var(wlj). Thus, since E(Vij) 
and CEij move in the same direction,8 it is simpler to define social welfare as SWj=C~j+CEQj' 
Therefore, onIy the certainty equivalents of the utility functions (10)-(13) will be used in the 
welfare analysis. 
8 Note that E[V¡(WL)] = l-EXP[-a¡(CE¡j)]' 
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111- REGULATION, RISK REALLOCATION, AND WELFARE 
Having set up the analytical framework, I tum to analyze the impact of the risk 
reallocation forced by the imposition of ITR on social welfare. Throughout the analysis, liquidity 
traders are assurned to be at least as risk averse as insiders; that is, ~~ aN0 9 I consider below 
two base cases: one in which insiders and liquidity traders are risk neutral, and another in which 
both are risk averse. Beginning from each base case, a sensitivity analysis is perfonned in which 
the risk aversion of one type of traders is varied while that of the other type of traders remains 
fixed. Throughout the analysis, the impact of ITR on social welfare is measured by SWU-SWR; 
hence, SWu-SWR>Oindicates that ITR is hannful, whereas SWu-SWR<Oindicates that ITR is 
beneficial. 
As argued above , the complexity of the equilibrium in the unregulated market prec1udes 
a tractable analysis in c10sed fonn. In order to find a numerical solution for the equilibrium in 
each market, particular values for the parameters of the model (El' EQ, w? and a¡) need to be 
assumed. The volatility of securities prices (E f =.04) and the variability of liquidity trading 
(EQ = .01) are taken from Leland (1992) and reflect average market data. The initial wealth of 
insiders and liquidity traders (w~=wg= 1) is nonnalized without loss of generality. Finally, the 
risk aversion of insiders and liquidity traders depends on the case under consideration and is 
specified below. Once the values of Ep EQ, w?, and a¡ are replaced into the systems (4)-(5) and 
(8)-(9), the model yields the equilibrium values of au, {3u, and aR' with {3R being exogenously 
detennined. 1O 
1.- Base case 1: Risk Neutrality (~=aQ=O) 
Under the assumption that insiders and liquidity traders are risk neutral, risk is not an 
9 Some of the most notorious insiders have been arbitrageurs (1ike Ivan Boesky) or 
investment bankers (like Dennis Levine). It seems plausible to assume that these traders, who 
repeatedly invest large sums of money in search for a quick profit, are inherentIy less risk averse 
than liquidity traders, who trade for liquidity reasons. 
10 Recall that the reason for not modelling a fully-effective regulation ({3R =0) is that of 
preventing the regulated market from becoming infinitely liquido Note that any arbitrari1y-small 
value of {3R would fit that purpose. Throughout the analysis, it is assumed that {3R={3min=.005. 
From a qualitative point of view, the results of the analysis are independent from this particular 
choice of {3R' 
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issue and the model becomes significantIy simpler. 11 Figure 1 depicts the relationship between 
the impact of ITR (measured by SWu-SWR) and the risk aversion of liquidity traders. This figure 
shows that, when both insiders and liquidity traders are risk neutral (the origin of Figure 1), the 
level of social welfare attained in the unregulated market is the same as that attained in the 
regulated market; that is, ITR has no impact on social welfare. This result follows from the fact 
that the expected profits gained by liquidity traders due to the imposition of ITR are exactIy 
offset by the expected profits lost by insiders due to the imposition of this regulation. Hence, 
ITR forces a redistribution of wealth that does not affect social welfare. 12 
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Figure 1 also shows that, as liquidity traders become more risk averse (while insiders 
remain risk neutral), the social cost of ITR increases. In order to rationalize this result, it is 
important to notice that ITR not only prevents insiders from trading; it also prevents them from 
bearing risk. Thus, the imposition of this regulation forces a reallocation of risk from traders 
that can bear risk at no cost (insiders) to traders that bear it at a higher cost (liquidity traders). 
As a consequence, the higher the risk aversion of liquidity traders, compared to that of insiders, 
11 In fact, under risk neutrality, it is possible to fmd a simple closed-form solution for the 
equilibrium in each market. In particular, in the unregulated market, this solution is given by 
a~=.5(E/EQ)1I2, and {3~=(EQ/EJ1I2. 
12 The impact of ITR on a securities market and on social welfare under the assumption of 
risk neutral traders is analyzed in detail in Estrada (l993a). 
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the higher the cost of the risk reallocation forced by ITR, and, therefore, the higher the cost of 
imposing this regulation. The results of this section are surnmarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: When all traders are risk neutral, ITR forces a reallocation of wealth that has 
no impact on social welfare. However, when insiders are risk neutral and liquidity traders are 
risk averse, ITR also forces a reallocation of risk whose cost is increasing in the risk aversion 
of liquidity traders. 
2.- Base Case 2: Risk Aversion (aN=~=l) 
The assumption of risk neutrality, though mathematically convenient, is empirically 
implausible, especially when applied to liquidity traders. Consider then a case in which both 
insiders and liquidity traders are risk averse. In particular, let the coefficient of risk aversion of 
both traders be aN= aQ= 1. Beginning from this initial situation, the differential risk aversion 
between ~nsiders and liquidity traders (satisfying the restriction aQ ~ aN) may be given by the fact 
that the risk aversion of liquidity traders is higher than ~ = 1, or that the risk aversion of 
insiders is lower than aN= 1. These two possibilities are considered in Figures 2 and 3, 
respectively. 
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Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the impact of ITR on social welfare and the risk 
aversion of liquidity traders, beginning from a situation in which insiders and liquidity traders 
are equally risk averse (aN=aQ = 1). This figure shows that, as the risk aversion of liquidity 
traders increases (and that of insiders remains fixed at aN= 1), the benefit of ITR decreases, and, 
11 
beyond a point, the cost of ITR increases. This result is explained as follows. The expected 
profits gained by liquidity traders are offset by the expected profits lost by insiders; hence, the 
wealth reallocation generated by ITR has no impact on social welfare. However, the risk 
reallocation forced by this regulation is costIy for it reallocates risk:' from traders that can bear 
risk at a low cost (insiders) to traders that bear it at a higher cost (liquidity traders). As a 
consequence, the higher the risk aversion of liquidity traders, compared to that of insiders (the 
larger aQ-aN), the higher the cost of the risk reallocation forced by the imposition of ITR. 
Figure 3, on the other hand, depicts the relationship between the impact ofITR on social 
welfare and the risk aversion of insiders, beginning from a case in which insiders and liquidity 
traders are equally risk averse (aN=aQ= 1). This figure shows that, as the risk aversion of 
insiders decreases (and that of liquidity traders remains fixed at ~ = 1), the benefit of ITR 
decreases, and, beyond a point, the cost of ITR increases; this result also follows from the risk-
reallocation argument explained above. The results of this section are surnmarized in the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 2: When all traders are risk averse, ITR forces a reallocation of risk whose cost is 
increasing in the difference in risk aversion between insiders and liquidity traders, as long as 
the risk aversion of the latter is higher than that of the fonner. 13 
IV· CONCLUSIONS 
I have argued in this paper that ITR forces not onIy a reallocation of wealth from insiders 
to liquidity traders, but also a reallocation of risk from the former to the latter. I have shown 
that, although the wealth reallocation does not have an impact on welfare, under the plausible 
assumption that liquidity traders are more risk averse than insiders, the risk reallocation is 
costIy. I have further shown that this cost is increasing in the difference in risk aversion between 
insiders and liquidity traders, as long as the risk aversion of the latter is higher than that of the 
former. Therefore, the policy implication of the analysis is clear: The more risk averse liquidity 
traders are believed to be compared to insiders, the weaker the case for imposing ITR. 
13 Propositions 1 and 2 can be jointIy taken as saying that (SWU·SWR) is an increasing 
function of (~-aN). 
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